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MUST DISPOSITIONS HAVE A BASIS? 
Joshua Hoffman 
In this paper I shall defend a controversial thesis 
concerning the analysis of dispositional attributions. 
According to this thesis, which I call the entailment 
thesis (ET), it'is a necessary truth that if a physical 
object x has a disposition d, then x has some intrinsic 
characteristic or characterotics in virtue of which it 
has d. 
In recent years philosophers have raised three 
important objections to ET. Two of these are due to 
J. L. Mackie. The first is that it is possible for 
there to be two objects with all the same intrinsic 
properties but different dispositions, and that this 
possibility is incompatible with ET. The second is that 
the possibility of action at a distance is incompatible 
with ET.1 The third objection, which has been independ-
ently voiced by William Alston and D. M. Armstrong, is 
that the possibility of there being basic physical 
objects is incompatible with ET. 2 
There is a short way of answering these objections: 
one can simply deny the possibilities on which they are 
premised. Those who take a Humean or generalist view 
of causation and of natural laws would probably reject 
out of hand the possibility of there being two objects 
with all the same intrinsic characteristics but dif-
ferent dispositions. Certainly, the possibility of 
action at a distance is controversial, and anyone who 
rejects it would be on ground at least as firm as some-
one who accepts it. Finally, many philosophers have 
found it implausible that there could be basic physical 
objects; these philosophers have usually thought that 
there must be an infinity of kinds of particles.^ 
In the present paper I shall not take the short 
route in any of the three cases described above. In-
stead, I will argue that even if one grants the 
possibilities on which these three objections to ET are 
based, it does not follow that ET is false. Hence, 
none of these objections are sufficient to refute ET. 
In the first section of this paper I shall explicate 
ET. In the second section I will show that none of the 
objections described above are sufficient to refute ET. 
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Finally, I will argue that since none of these objections 
succeed, and since a limited version of ET which applies 
only to standard cases of dispositional attribution is 
clearly true, our acceptance of ET is warranted. 
I 
We may distinguish several different kinds of dis-
positions. A first distinction is between deterministic 
dispositions, or dispositions which are unfailingly 
manifested in the appropriate circumstances, and pröba-
bilitistic dispositions, which are only sometimes mani-
fested in the appropriate circumstances. A second 
distinction is between dispositions which may be mani-
fested in several different ways and dispositions which 
may be manifested in only one way. In this paper, in 
order to simplify matters, I shall concern myself only 
with deterministic dispositions which are singly-
manifested. Similarly, while dispositions may be 
attributed to individuals in varying degrees of specifi-
city, I shall presuppose that an ideal specification has 
been made of (i) the circumstances C which are sufficient 
for the manifestation of a disposition d of an individual 
x, and (ii) the process jji which x undergoes when in C. 
According to the view which I will defend, if x has a 
disposition d to i^-in^-C, then there is a law of nature 
L which is expressed in terms of ^ and C, and which 
subsumes x. Therefore, C and tj^  are ideally specified 
just when they are specified to the degree required to 
fully state L. 
Consider the following schema: 
(1) At t, x is disposed to ^-in-C. 
In (1), 'x' 't', 'jj^ ', and *C' are schematic letters, 
'x* is to be replaced with a proper name denoting a 
physical object, ' t* with the name of a time, 'jp' with 
a process-predicate, and * C' with an expression describ-
ing a set of circumstances.1* I take (1) to be the para-
digm form of dispositional attribution. 
If an object has a (deterministic) disposition, then 
there is a law of nature in the offing. In other words, 
dispositional attributions entail laws of nature or 
statements of physical necessity. 5 Such laws of nature 
are typically statements of the form, ' (y_) (if y_ is 
£ in C, then y_ ^p's)', 6 where '•' means "it is physically 
necessary that", and where '<p' designates an intrinsic 
property of a physical object. Since dispositional 
attributions entail laws, and since these laws provide 
nomically sufficient conditions for the dispositional 
attributions which entail them, it is a necessary truth 
that there is a nomically sufficient condition for a 
particular object's having a particular disposition. 
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I need not commit myself here to any interpretation 
of nomic or physical necessity, but it is important that 
I make clear how one's understanding of the physical 
modalities has a bearing on the concerns of this paper. 
In what follows, I shall draw a distinction between 
general and non-general laws of nature, a distinction I 
will make use of in explicating ET. I will also show 
how this first distinction is related to a distinction 
between de diclo and de re statements of physical 
necessity. 
On one view of laws of nature, which we may call 
the Hurnean or generalist view, it is a necessary truth 
that all laws of nature are gene ral. Roughly speaking, 
a law of nature is general just when it can be expressed 
by a universally quantified sentence which makes no 
reference to any particular individual. Conversely, a 
law of nature is non-general just when it can only be 
expressed by a sentence which makes reference to some 
particular. 
- On what may be called a realist view of laws of 
nature, we can quantify into causal contexts. An 
adequate interpretation of the resulting quantified 
causal logic implies that for every de dicto statement 
of physical necessity there is a corresponding state-
ment de_ re. 7 For example, corresponding to the de_ dicto 
schema above is a schema de re: (v_) (y^  is physically 
necessarily such that: if y_~Ts <{>_ in C, then £ tj^' s > . A 
statement of physical necessity de re explicitly at-
tributes a nomic property or properties to some individ-
ual or class individuals. 
In the following discussion I will draw a distinc-
tion between two different relations in which laws of 
nature can stand to particulars. This distinction will 
then be used to distinguish two types of non-general 
laws. The first is the familar relation of nomic 
subsumption. It can be defined as follows: 
(Dl) A law of nature L subsumes an individual x = 
df. (i) any English sentence expressing L is 
logically equivalent to a sentence of the form 
(y_) (if y_ is £ in C, then y_ £*s) • , and (ii) 
it is physically possible for x to be £ in C. 
The second relation holds whenever we have a non-general 
law of nature. Such a law makes reference to a particu-
lar individual or set of individuals, and for this 
reason may be said to involve these individuals: 
(D2) A law of nature L involves an individual x = 
df. Any English sentence expressing L con-
tains a singular term which denotes x. 8 
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I shall now show that given a realist interpreta-
tion of laws of nature, there is no reason to question 
the existence of non-general laws of nature of a certain 
kind, namely, laws which are non-general with respect 
to the class of individuals which they involve and which 
are derivable from general laws. I call a law of this 
kind a derivable, non-general law of nature (DNL). The 
notion of a DNL can be defined with the help of the con-
cepts of subsumption and involvement. Consider a non-
general law L, which is of the form • (if x is in C, 
then x ty's)'. L is a DNL if and only if there is a 
corresponding general law L' which is equivalent to a 
statement of the form 'Q (y_) (if y_ is £ in C, then y t*s)' 
Hence, any DNL can be logically derived from the conjunc-
tion of a general law and an existential statement 
asserting the existence of some particular individual 
or individuals which the DNL involves and which the 
general law subsumes. For this reason, if one is will-
ing to countenance general laws of nature interpreted 
along realist lines, then one should also affirm the 
existence of DNLs. 
However, it is important to distinguish DNLs from 
non-derivable, non-general laws of nature (NNLs). An 
NNL would be a realistically interpreted non-general law 
which was not derivable from a general law conjoined 
with an existential statement of the sort described. 
In other words, if a non-general law of the form 'D (if 
x is $ in C,- then x ^ ' s ) ' were true, but there were no 
corresponding general law of the form (v_) (if y_ is <f> 
in C, then y_ t j i's)' , then the former would be an NNL. 
For this reason, the possibility of NNLs cannot be in-
ferred from the existence of realistically interpreted 
general laws. 
ET says that it is a matter of necessity that every 
disposition of an object have a basis in its intrinsic 
characteristics. For this reason it is important to 
have an understanding of the notion of an IC or intrinsic 
characteristic of a physical object. I shall say that 
an IC P of a physical object x is either (i) an essential 
property of x, or (ii) a contingent property of x which 
is necessarily such that x acquires or loses P if and 
only if x undergoes a change in parts or in arrangement 
of parts, i.e., in its structural/compositional proper-
ties. This implies that the property of being next to 
something, for example, is not an IC of any physical 
object, for the location of another individual may entail 
that x acquire or lose this property. 
ET says that if a physical object has a disposition 
d, then it has d in virtue of having an IC. The follow-
ing is a definition of the in virtue of relation: 
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(D3) At t, x is disposed to tp-in-C in virtue of having 
an IC <b = df. (i) at t, x has <J>; and (ii) D(y.) 
(if y_ is * in C, then y tpTs) v Q (if x is £ in C, 
then x f s ) . 
Clause (ii) of (D3) is a disjunction because just what 
kind of law of nature is entailed by an objects's having 
a disposition depends on whether or not NNLs are possible. 
Suppose that 
(2) At t, x has the disposition d to ^~in-C, and that 
(3) At.t, x has d in virtue of having an IG 
If NNLs are impossible, then the conjunction of (2) and 
(3) entails 
(4) Q(y) (if y_ is £ in C, then y_ £'s). 
On the other hand, if NNLs are possible, then one cannot 
infer from x's having d in virtue of being $ that it is 
a law of nature that every object which is £ has d. In 
other words, if NNLs are possible, the conjunction of 
(2) and (3) entails 
(5) D(if x i s j i n C, then x jp's), 
but not (M). For these reasons, if NNLs are impossible, 
then the analysandum of (D3) entails that there are 
general laws of nature, while if NNLs are possible, then 
the analysandum of (D3) entails that there are non-
general laws of nature. 
The thesis which I shall defend in the following 
sections (the entailment thesis) is that 
(1) At t, x is disposed to tp-in-C (where d = the 
disposition to ^-in-C) 
logically implies that at t, x has some IC in virtue of 
which it has d. 9 
II 
In this section, I will consider and refute three 
objections to ET. The first objection, which is Mackie*s, 
is the claim that it is possible for there to be two 
physical objects with all the same ICs but different 
dispositions, and that this possibility is inconsistent 
with ET. 
Mackie appears to presuppose the impossibility of 
NNLs in voicing his first objection to ET (Mackie, p. 
133). He distinguishes between dispositions and what 
he calls "minimal dispositions" (Mackie, pp. 127-28). 
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Mackie seems to be saying that an object x has a minimal 
disposition d if and only if (i) x has d, and (ii) x 
does not have d in virtue of having any property or 
properties other than d. Mackie argues that minimal dis-
positions are possible, and in support of this claim he 
describes the following state of affairs: 
There are two glasses a and b, both made at 
time ti» which not only look alike but are 
alike in all their intrinsic features. At 
time t2» each is knocked hard in the same way; 
a breaks and b does not. Moreover, this would 
have happened if they had both been similarly 
knocked at any time between t_i and 1 2 . (Mackie, 
p. 130) 
Let us call- this state of affairs SI. Mackie's argument 
is that since SI is possible, minimal dispositions are 
possible; and if minimal dispositions are possible, 
then ET is false. 
If glass a were to have a minimal disposition d to 
break-when-knocked-hard, that a would not have d in 
virtue of having any property other than d—this much 
follows from the concept of a minimal disposition. 
Mackie seems to think that SI implies that a has a 
minimal disposition d because (i) by hypothesis, a 
does not have d in vlfrtue of having any non-intrinsic 
property, and a's having some non-intrinsic property is 
not a nomically necessary condition for a's having d,lC 
and (ii) since, also by hypothesis, a and b have all the 
same ICs and a and d but b does not, therefore a does 
not have d in virtue of having any IC or ICs. 
The trouble here is with the inference that Mackie 
draws in (ii). If NNLs are possible, then glass a's 
having d in virtue of having some IC or set of ICs b is 
consistent with glass b's having £ and not having d. 
Hence, unless NNLs are impossible, (ii) is false. In 
other words, the possibility of SI does not by itself 
entail the falsity of ET; instead, the possibility of 
SI entails either that ET is false or Lhat NNLs are 
possible. If NNLs are possible and SI obtains, then 
there is an NNL of the form, Q (if glass a is tp_ when 
knocked hard, then a breaks) 1 , where <fr is the IC or* ICs 
in virtue of which a and d. In this case there would 
be no corresponding NNL of the form, (if glass b is 
£ when knocked hard, then b breaks) 1. 
In order to refute ET, Mackie would have to prove 
both that (i) SI is possible, and (ii) NNLs are impos-
sible. But (i) and (ii) cannot both be true. If SI is 
possible, then it is possible that there is a law of 
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nature L which subsumes a but not b* and which states a 
nomically sufficient condition for a's having d. Of 
what form will L be? Since we have stipulated that a's 
having some non-intrinsic property or properties is 
neither nomically necessary nor sufficient for a's 
having d, L will state a nomically sufficient condition 
for a's having d in terms of a's having some IC or ICs. 
But a and b have all the same ICs. Therefore, L cannot 
be a~"general law, since if it were, it would also sub-
sume b. Hence, L must be an NNL which involves a and not b. 
These considerations show that whatever plausibility 
there is in saying that SI is possible derives from the 
plausibility of the assertion that NNLs are possible. 
Since the possibility of SI entails the possibility Of 
NNLs, and since the possibility of SI is incompatible 
with ET only if NNLs are impossible, Mackie is mistaken 
in thinking that the possibility of SI is incompatible 
with ET. 
It might be argued that Mackie's case against ET 
can be improved by adding the following assumption to 
SI: no matter how a's structural/compositional proper-
ties were altered—so long as a still existed—a would 
retain d. This added assumption implies that a does not 
have d in virtue of any of its purely qualitative ICs. 
If at time t^, a possesses d and a does not possess 
d in virtue of having some purely qualitative IC or ICs, 
then a possesses d in virtue of having some non-qualita-
tive IC or ICs, for example * the property of being iden-
tical with a, or the property of being that object,!* or 
in virtue of having some conjunction of qualitative and 
non-qualitative ICs. Hence, the assumption that a does 
not have d in virtue of having any purely qualitative 
ICs is inconsistent with Mackie's prior assumption that 
a and b are alike in all their ICs. To describe a con-
sistent state of affairs this new example (S2) must 
require only that a and b are alike in all their purely 
qualitative ICs. In this case, the possibility of S2 
does not entail the falsity of ET.. If S2 is possible, 
then it is possible that there are non-qualitative ICs. 
And if S2 were to obtain, then (ignoring the more compli-
cated case where a has d in virtue of having a conjunc-
tion of qualitative and non-qualitative ICs) (i) a would 
possess d in virtue of having some non-qualitative IC, 
for example the property of being identical with a, and 
(ii) there would be an NNL of the form, (y_) (if* y is 
identical with a and is knocked hard, then y breaks)'. 
(Notice that while a sentence of this form Ts universally 
quantified, nevertheless it expresses a non-general law 
because it makes ineliminable reference to a particular.) 
This law, together with the statement that a has the 
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property of being identical with a and b does not, ex-
plains a's having d and b's not having d. 
A second kind of objection to ET has also been 
raised by Mackie, and is based on the possibility of 
action at a (temporal) distance (Mackie, p. 131).12 
Mackie claims that the following state of affairs (S3) 
is possible: there are two objects a and b which are 
alike in all their ICs; when a is struck hard it breaks, 
but when b is struck hard it doesn't break; the difference 
in how a and b react to being struck hard is caused by 
their different methods of manufacture, and not by any 
occurrent events or conditions. Mackie thinks"that if 
S3 obtains, then a and b have different dispositions but 
all the same ICs. From this he concludes that if S3 
obtains, then there are dispositions which are not had 
in virtue of any ICs, and that ET is false.* 3 
As I have shown for SI, if NNLs are possible, then 
one can grant that a and b have all the same ICs and 
different dispositions and still maintain that whatever 
dispositions a and b have they have in virtue of posses-
sing certain ICs. But this reply is not needed here, for 
Mackie is mistaken if he thinks that S3 implies that a 
and b have different dispositions. They have all the 
same dispositions , including the disposition d to break-
when-struck-hard-if-manufactured-by-method-m, where 
method m is a's method of manufacture. In other words, 
the method of manufacture m is a relevant circumstance 
of the manifestation of d. The feature of S3 which 
implies action at a distance is that a past circumstance 
continues to be a causally relevant circumstance of the 
manifestation of d. This way of understanding S3 
implies that object b does not break when struck hard 
because the circumstance of being struck hard is not 
sufficient to manifest its disposition d. One of the 
necessary conditions of the manifestation of d is miss-
ing, namely, having been manufactured by method m. 
Since this circumstance is no longer possible, it is 
not possible for b to manifest d. This is peculiar, 
but the peculiarity is inherited from the assumption of 
action at a temporal distance. I1* 
Hence, S3 does not describe a possible state of 
affairs in which an object has a disposition but does 
not have it in virtue of possessing certain ICs. In 
other words, the possibility of S3 is consistent with 
the truth of ET. 
It might be objected at this point that my interpre-
tation of S3 begs the question against Mackie. Of 
course, I think that my interpretation is the more intui-
tive, but obviously Mackie does not share my intuition. 
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In a situation like this, when philosophers have dif-
ferent intuitions concerning conceptual claims, the 
proper procedure to follow in attempting to resolve the 
dispute is to appeal to some criterion or principle. I 
shall argue in Section III below that ET is clearly true 
for a large class of standard cases. In addition, a3 
the preceding discussion has shown, S3 admits of an 
interpretation consistent with ET.. In these circum-
stances, if there are'no other reasons for preferring 
Mackie's interpretation of S3, then the fact that my 
interpretation of S3 enables us to formulate a uniform 
theory of dispositions while Mackie's does not puts the 
onus on Mackie to provide an unequivocal counterexample 
to ET based on the possibility of actioh at a distance. 
S3 is not such a counterexample. 
A third kind of objection to ET is based on the 
possibility of there being basic physical objects. 
Before discussing this objection it will be helpful to 
elucidate the notions of a non-basic physical object 
and a basic physical object. Non-basic physical objects 
are such that it is physically possible to break them 
into proper parts. The ICs of such objects that are 
relevant to their having dispositions are usually 
internal states. These internal states are structural/ 
compositional properties, the molecular, atomic, or sub-
atomic make-ups of these objects. Basic physical objects 
are such that it is not physically possible to break them 
into proper parts.15 They have no structural/composition-
al properties; therefore, if any entity of this sort has 
a disposition in virtue of having a certain IC, then 
this IC cannot be a structural/compositional property. 
William Alston's view is representative of the 
objection to ET based on the possibility of there being 
basic physical objects: 
. . . we cannot claim that a dispositonal 
attribution entails the existence of a basis; 
it is not necessary that every disposition have 
a basis. In particular, if there are atomic 
substances with no internal structure (and this 
would seem to be at least logically possible), 
they will undoubtedly have dispositions, for 
they will undoubtedly react in characteristic 
ways to certain conditions. But since they 
lack any internal structure, there can be no 
question of various features of their structure 
serving as the basis for various dispositions. 
Their dispositions will be ultimate properties. 
(Alston, p. 1U3) 
12 3 
To cite another example, while D. M. Armstrong maintains 
that necessarily, if a non-basic physical object lias a 
disposition d, then it is in some state which is the 
basis of d, he does not insist on extending this claim 
to basic physical objects. He is willing to say that in 
the case where we have a basic physical object, " . . . 
we might reach ultimate potentialities of the disposed 
thing, potentialities which do not depend upon non-
dispositional properties" (Armstrong, pp. 13-14). 
Alston and Armstrong confuse two roles which an IC, 
may. play. First, <£, may play a role in a theory which 
explains why it is a law of nature that an individual 
x ^'s when ^ in C. Second, £ may play a role in the 
explanation of x rs having a disposition d in ^-in-C. 
In its former guise, £ is the structural/composi-
tional property of x which explains by characterizing a 
causal mechanism, why x £'s when <J> in C. For example, 
the molecular structure of salt, Tn the context of the 
atomic theory of matter, characterizes a causal mechanism 
whose workings explain why it is a law of nature that 
salt dissolves in water. 
In its later guise, £ is the IC of x in virtue of 
which x has d. In this case, there is a law of nature 
which asserts that D(if x is £ in C, then x s) , or a 
law of nature which asserts that CJ~(y) (if y is ^ in C, 
then y jjl/s). This, together with the proposition that 
x is explains why x has d in the sense that it entails 
that x has d. 
An IC of an object can play the latter role without-
playing the former, but not vice-versa. Hence, though 
it is true that the ICs of a basic physical object could 
not play the former role vis-a-vis the dispositions of 
that object, they could and would play the latter role 
vis-a-yis those dispositions. Since this is all that 
ET requires of the ICs of a basic physical object— 
namely, that for every disposition d of a basic physical 
object x there is some one or more TCs of x in virtue 
of which it has .d--the possibility of there being basic 
physical objects is consistent with the truth of ET. 
We have noted that if there were basic physical 
objects then the ICs in virtue of which they had their 
dispositions would not be structural/compositional 
properties. What sort of properties would they be? If 
all laws of nature were either general or DNLs , then 
the ICs in question would be sortal or natural kind 
properties, e.g., being a basic physical object, being 
a field of potential, being a photon. On the other 
hand, if there were NNLs involving basic individuals, 
12'» 
then the ICs in virtue of which those individuals 
possessed their dispositions would be either the above 
sort of properties or else non-qualitative ICs, e.g. , 
the property of being identical with a, or the property 
of being that individual. 
Ill 
We have considered several objections to ET. I have 
shown that even if we concede the possibility of the 
states of affairs upon which these objections are based, 
their possibility is compatible with the truth of ET. 
Since there are no good objections to ET, there is no 
logical bar to our accepting it. Hence, we will be 
warranted in accepting ET if we can show that there are 
good reasons for making ET a part of our theory of 
dispositions. These reasons are as follows. 
There is a broad class of dispositional attributions 
where ET clearly fits the facts. Consider a standard 
situation, i.e., a situation where an object x has a 
disposition d to ^-in-C, and where it is physically 
possible for x to be in C and not have d. As we have 
seen, x's having d entails that there is a law of 
nature~which subsumes x_. Since, by hypothesis, it is 
physically possible for x to be in C and fail to <J>, 
this law does not assert simply that Dtif x is in C, 
then x ty's), or that Q(y_) (if y is in C, they y_ •£* s). 
Rather, x's having d entails that (e<}0[Tx is £) & 
O (if x is <£. in C, then x £'s) v (y_) (If y_ is £ in 
C, then y_ £'s)) ] , where $ is an IC* In other words, in 
standard cases of the sort described, x's having d en-
tails that x has an IC in virute of which it has d, and 
ET is true at least for those cases. 
Therefore, any consistent theory of dispositions 
which implies that dispositional attributions entail 
laws, i.e.,any nomological theory of dispositions, 
implies a version of ET which pertains at least to this 
standard class of cases. While some of the critics of 
ET concede the plausibility of a version of ET which 
has limited scope, they object to extending this limited 
version to include certain non-standard cases, namely, 
the cases we have examined above (Mackie, p. 133). 
Since we must accept a limited version of ET in any 
case, an adequate nomological theory of dispositions 
can provide a uniform analysis of dispositional attribu-
tions only if it entails ET. Because of this , and 
because none of the objections to ET succeed, our 
acceptance of ET is warranted, and it is reasonale to 
conclude that ET is part of the analysis of disposition-
al attributions. 1 6 
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